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Education, outreach and the OPCW: growing partnerships for a global ban


Joseph Ballard and Jonathan E. Forman, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, NL

05/02/16 to 05/06/16

The Chemical Weapons Convention remains a landmark international treaty.  It was the first multilateral agreement to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction and include a strict verification regime to monitor compliance.  Scientists were not only deeply engaged in the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, but have been central to the life of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) ever since it came into existence almost 20 years ago.  Over that time, during which the OPCW focused primarily on its mission to oversee the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, the organisation has relied on a very committed core of scientific expertise – from within and outside – to help guide it.  As that core task comes to a close, the Organisation faces a new challenge: ensuring that chemical weapons do not return.  Meeting that challenge will require new approaches to the OPCW’s mission.



Education, Outreach and the OPCW: Growing Partnerships for a Global Ban

Joseph Ballard and Jonathan E. Forman

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, The Netherlands



The Chemical Weapons Convention remains a landmark international treaty.  It was the first multilateral agreement to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction and include a strict verification regime to monitor compliance.  Scientists were not only deeply engaged in the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, but have been central to the life of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) ever since it came into existence almost 20 years ago.  Over that time, during which the OPCW focused primarily on its mission to oversee the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, the organisation has relied on a very committed core of scientific expertise – from within and outside – to help guide it.  As that core task comes to a close, the Organisation faces a new challenge: ensuring that chemical weapons do not return.  Meeting that challenge will require new approaches to the OPCW’s mission.


Education, Outreach and the OPCW: Growing Partnerships for a Global Ban

We begin this Confchem as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) celebrates its founding at the inaugural OPCW Day event in The Hague;[1] an event that reflects back on the organisations nineteen year journey to 2016 and looks toward the future and the evolving nature of chemical disarmament.  OPCW Day brings together diplomats, experts in disarmament and security, leaders in science and industry and more.  It is an event with a public face, intended to engage those working both within and beyond disarmament.  Why does an organisation focused on security issues seek to engage broader audiences and in particular, scientific audiences?   The answer lies within the broad range of issues and activities required for the implementation and effectiveness of a science based disarmament treaty.  From 2 May to 1 July 2016, Confchem presents papers from scientists involved in the work of the OPCW and this August OPCW will feature in a symposium at the 24th IUPAC International Conference on Chemistry Education.[2]  These events support OPCWs objectives of engaging with those who practice and study science, as well as the Organisations broader outreach goals, which we describe in this opening paper of the Spring 2016 Confchem.

The OPCW – where science and diplomacy meet

The OPCW is one of a handful of international organisations that exist at the intersection of science and diplomacy.[3]  Its success underpinned by through partnership between the scientific and diplomatic communities that serve the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) [4] – which the OPCW was set up to oversee – since its entry into force in 1997.  Today, after nineteen years in force, the CWC has one-hundred and ninety-two States Parties (The nations supporting the treaty); only four States are not subject to the obligations of the CWC (see Figure 1).

Figure 1:  States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention.   As of 16 October 2015, four states remain not party to the CWC:  Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Israel (signed, but not ratified) and South Sudan.

The CWC is a unique international instrument: it is the first – and remains the only – multilateral disarmament treaty that prohibits a whole category of weapons of mass destruction in a verifiable way.  The CWC was a huge step forward for international peace and security – the then-UN Secretary-General described the CWC in 1997 as “a momentous act of peace”.[5]  And it only came together through the efforts of scientists and diplomats working toward a commonly-held goal.[6] 

Treaty implementation has four key areas of focus, as illustrated in Figure 2: destruction of chemical weapons; non-proliferation and the prevention of re-emergence of chemical weapons (this includes verification activities such as declarations, inspections and investigations); capacity building and training in assistance and protection; and promoting international cooperation in the peaceful use of chemistry for economic and technological development.  Across these areas, verification is has been key to the CWC’s success.  Verification goes right to the heart of the trust and confidence that multilateral treaties, particularly those that touch on peace and security, need to work.  These allow all parties to the treaty to verify each other’s compliance.

Figure 2:  Areas of focus for the OPCW in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The CWC’s verification regime allows international chemical weapons inspectors to verify the destruction of military stockpiles (of which States Parties are under obligation to destroy) and to inspect chemical production facilities (including commercial facilities) meeting certain criteria within the territories of the States that have joined the treaty.  These inspectors, who have deep technical knowledge of chemical production processes, chemical weapons destruction techniques, and chemical analysis,[7] have carried out over 6,000 inspections around the world since 1997.  Their work, which is reported back to the States Parties that meet regularly in The Hague to review the operation of the CWC, has been critical to ensuring the treaty’s integrity.  An example of the how the CWC can draw scientific and diplomatic worlds together. 

This connection was created through the CWC’s negotiation, during which scientific principles were used to help define the kinds of weapons and chemicals the treaty should be concerned with and to construct a viable verification regime.  And we see the science and diplomacy connection throughout the work of the OPCW today.  The Scientific Advisory Board, an independent body of twenty-five scientific experts nominated by States Parties and appointed by the Director-General, renders specialised advice on science and technology that could affect the operation of the treaty.[8]  The OPCW works closely with the chemical industry on matters of mutual concern.  And the CWC fosters international cooperation in the peaceful use of chemistry through its capacity building programmes.[9]

There are other international treaties that ban categories of weapons of mass destruction, most notably the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).[10]  But that treaty – which entered into force much earlier than the CWC, in 1975 – contains no verification provisions.


A changing Organisation in a changing world

While the CWC is a strong example of science serving the cause of global peace and security, for many years the OPCW’s achievements were little known beyond those directly involved in implementation, particularly those involved in the complex verification regime.  The Organisation’s work was focused primarily on ensuring the destruction of declared stockpiles of chemical weapons, and it has been very successful: today, fewer than 10% of the original stockpiles are now left, and within the next few years all will be destroyed.  At the same time, 192 States are now party to the Convention, making it the most widely subscribed disarmament and non-proliferation treaty in history.  The CWC’s verification system continues to support States Parties’ confidence in treaty compliance, and for “its extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons" the OPCW was awarded the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize.[11]  Recent events in Syria have likewise pushed the OPCW onto the world stage.[12]

The OPCW and its accomplishments have raised an important question: in an era when the declared global stockpiles of chemical weapons have been all but destroyed, what is the role of an Organisation dedicated to their abolition?  The answer to that question lies in the CWC itself, in which the treaty’s States Parties state clearly their determination “for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons”.  What does this mean today, in a world where we are constantly reminded of the threat of chemical weapons in ways that were certainly unanticipated in 1997?[13]

The first part of answering this question lies in the word “declared” – while those chemical weapons that have been declared to the Organisation by its current States Parties will soon be destroyed, there remain States outside the CWC.  The possibility of new States joining with stockpiles of chemical weapons is one that the OPCW must continue to plan and prepare for.  And we will continue to work on the important issue of the recovery and destruction of old and abandoned chemical weapons – one of the most pernicious ongoing legacies of past conflicts.[14]

This also means ensuring that the States Parties to the CWC continue to live up to their obligations.  We do this through the operation of the CWC’s verification system, which applies not only to chemical weapons stockpiles and related facilities, but also to commercial chemical sites and production of relevance to the CWC.  Every year, our States Parties file declarations about these sites and about production levels of certain chemicals.  And every year teams of OPCW inspectors go to over 240 industrial chemical production facilities around the world to verify those declarations.[15]  At the same time, our inspectors are ready to deploy at short notice in case of compliance concerns or when the use of chemical weapons has been alleged. 

As has recently become all too apparent, working to ensure that chemical weapons do not re-emerge goes beyond looking at the actions of governments.  Non-State actors have recently shown themselves to be all too willing to use chemical weapons.  The confirmed use of chemical weapons in the conflict in Syria and in Iraq poses new challenges for the CWC regime and the norm it enshrines[16].  And the evocation of the possible use by terrorists of chemical weapons in attacks in Europe[17] and elsewhere[18] has heightened public awareness of the continuing threat of chemical weapons. 

Confronting these challenges will require the OPCW to adjust its priorities, to look beyond its traditional networks, and to enlist a new generation in the service of its mission.  Our science engagement must go beyond the small circle of committed scientific experts – both from within and outside the Organisation – that have helped to guide our work until now.  Our industry outreach will need to engage not only those who are directly involved in implementing the treaty’s complex verification regime, but also those who regularly use, transport, trade in or store toxic chemicals.  Our work with educators and young people will need to focus on building better global citizens as well as responsible future scientists.

Above all, we know that ensuring chemical weapons do not return is a task that the OPCW cannot do on its own.  And while science (and its practitioners) will remain central to our mission, it is just one part of a much broader undertaking in which education and outreach will play a growing role.

Education and outreach for peace

So while there is much work to be done, we already have a good base to build on.  The OPCW’s website is generally the first port of call for anyone interested in the Organisation – it has special sections describing our work,[19] with a particular emphasis on our scientific engagement.  A set of factsheets, now available in all six OPCW official languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Spanish and Russian)[20], detail the various facets of the Organisation, the history of chemical weapons and efforts to control and eradicate them, and the functioning of the Convention and its verification regime. 

The OPCW website also hosts a set of e-learning resources, with modules focused on general information about the Organisation and the Convention as well as more specialist courses to training those involved in CWC verification.[21]  And it showcases an innovative initiative designed to connect with new audiences: the FIRES project, a series of short films about personal stories linked to chemical weapons.[22]  These films aim to engage a broad range of audiences in the story of the OPCW and international efforts to eradicate chemical weapons. 

The Organisation’s website also provides links to science education projects, like the Multiple Uses of Chemicals project[23] developed by IUPAC with the cooperation of the OPCW.  We will be doing more of this kind of work – aimed at supporting educators – in the future.

To round off our engagement in the digital space, the Organisation is active across a range of social media platforms.  We are now working at ramping up our activities in this area, starting with a redesigned website.  For those interested in both scientific and educational focused materials available from the OPCW, Figure 3 provides an interactive guide to find a variety of materials available for download and social media accounts.

Figure 3:  Online resources available from and OPCW social media accounts; this figure is interactive with hyperlinks to the indicated materials and information.

OPCW continues to work closely with its States Parties on building support and engagement on for outreach and engagement.  In 2016, four regional meetings are to be held with representatives of States Parties to discuss and make recommendations on how the OPCW can support member states in this area, and vice versa.[24]  These regional meetings also provide the opportunity for officials in our States Parties to think about their own national stakeholders on CWC implementation and to share ideas about how to reach them most effectively.

At the same time, OPCW works to engage the global chemical industry more.  Industry has always been a key player in the operation of the CWC’s verification regime (and industry representatives participated in treaty negotiation), but its importance is assuming a new dimension in the fight against chemical terrorism.  The chemical industry, and the individuals that work in it, are a key to the success of the OPCW in tackling this troubling issue.

Looking beyond the chemical industry, the OPCW has also supported work to engage chemical practitioners on the topic of responsible practices.  To this end, in 2015 the Organisation coordinated the drafting by a diverse group of scientists of The Hague Ethical Guidelines, a set of elements considered important, from a CWC perspective, in relevant professional codes.  The guidelines can be found on the OPCW website in all official languages.[25] 

Reaching out to young people is one of the most important facets of our education and outreach work.  To that end, the OPCW has established partnerships with Leiden and Groningen Universities in the Netherlands, and runs an annual WMD Summer School, in association with the TMC Asser Institute, in The Hague.[26]   

Finally, one of the most important new initiatives that the OPCW has taken over the last year is the decision to bring in outside expertise to advise us on how we scale up OPCW education and outreach to support the Organisation’s strategic priorities.  The Advisory Board on Education and Outreach is a group of 15 experts from around the world, appointed by the OPCW Director-General to advise both the OPCW Secretariat and CWC States Parties on this important work.[27]  Its mandate covers not only high-level strategic advice but also ensuring that the OPCW’s education and outreach activities are coordinated and cost effective – to do this it will monitor global science education and disarmament and non-proliferation education initiatives, as well as propose partnerships with other stakeholders.  It will also be tasked with developing a portfolio of activities and projects, so that the widest possible range of audiences can benefit from them.

But the most important aspect of the establishment of the new Advisory Board – which met for the first time on 28 and 29 April in The Hague– is that it represents a potential sea-change in the way that the OPCW interacts with the world.  It represents the recognition that achieving the aims of the CWC will in the future require a whole new kind of engagement – one that is underpinned with robust strategies, with flexible and modern educational tools, and with the support of new stakeholders.  Most importantly it means that education and outreach has a clear strategic role in the future of the Organisation.




[1] International Day for the Foundation of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (

[2] 24th IUPAC International Conference on Chemistry Education ( 

[3] Beatrice Maneshi, Jonathan E. Forman, “The Intersection of Science and Chemical Disarmament,” Science & Diplomacy, Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 2015)


[4] Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction; Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (

[5] Opening remarks of UNSG Kofi Annan to the first CWC Conference of States Parties, 6 May 1997 (

[6] For an overview of the historical development of the CWC, see:

[7] Several OPCW staff members with scientific backgrounds, including an inspector, featured in a recent article in the jobs section of Chemistry World, see

[9] In this regard, OPCW offers a number of capacity building programmes for science in developing countries; more information is available at

[10] The Biological Weapons Convention: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction; United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (

[12] United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, December 2013 (

[13] See, for instance, Ahmet Üzümcü “Syria’s Continuing Chemical Fallout”

[14] References on legacy chemical weapons (which include old, abandoned and sea dumped chemical weapons can be found in the two most recent issues of The OPCW Science and Technology Monitor (issues 3.1 and 3.2, and

[15] Annual Reports summarise yearly verification activities of the OPCW including both chemical demilitarisation and industrial inspection activities (

[16] See reference 13.

[26] Summer Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in a Changing World (  

[27] The formal decision to establish the Advisory Board, and its terms of reference, can be found at ; the current membership of the board can be viewed at


Bob Belford's picture


Today we start discussion of paper 1 of this year's ConfChem, "Education, outreach and the OPCW: growing partnerships for a global ban", by Joseph Ballard and Jonathan Forman of the Organization for the Probhibition of Chemical Weapons.

This year we are discussing one paper a week on Monday - Friday.  I am also still adding some updates to this paper, and should be finished within an hour or two, but wanted to announce the paper now, before any more time elapses.

I will also take the liberty to comment that today is the OPCW day,, and in addition to running this online conference the authors are involved with a 3 day program at the Hague.  That said, please make comments on their papers and they will reply as quickly as they can.

I would like to thank the authors for the efforts in sharing their work with us, and hope you all will enjoy and benefit from this year's ConfChem.


Bob Belford


Bob Belford's picture

Dear Joe and Jonathan,

I would like to thank you for this very interesting and informative article on OPCW outreach and partnerships.  I have a lot of questions and will start out with some broad ones.  You may want to respond to these with separate comments.

First, I understand OPCW has internships.  Could you describe the nature of these?  Are there internships that chemistry majors could apply for?

Second, could you tell us a bit about OPCW day? I realize we are now in the middle of the conference, are there any types of activities or events that educators might want to know about, or could even remotely participate in?

I do appreciate your sharing your work with us.

Bob Belford

Hi Bob,

Thanks for kicking this off.

Interns at OPCW work on a variety of things, it really depends on which division/unit they work in.  Interns might support the day to day work of their supervisor, perform library/literature research, prepare educational/promotional materials, build elearning tools, support and help facilitate meetings (including those that are attended by delegations from the governments of the Member States), and so on.

In the office Joe and I work in (Office of Strategy and Policy), interns have helped us with the recent meetings of the Scientific Advisory Board ( and Advisory Board on Education and Outreach ( as well as OPCWDay (

Previous interns in the office have produced science communication materials, contributed to publications, and have been involved with working on a science communication focused social media project.

The two documents at the following links are what we have been calling our “2015 Intern Annual Reports” as most of the content and the compilation of information was prepared by interns who were working in our office during 2015.

In general, most of the intern applications we see are from non-science majors, yet we really like to see people with science/engineering backgrounds and there are plenty of places where they are helpful (especailly in our office).  The analytical thinking and approaches to problem solving that come with training in science can be really helpful even when working on non-techncial projects.

More information on OPCW internships can be found at

In addition to our office, those with science backgrounds might be interested in internships at the OPCW Lab, the international cooperation branch (the branch that facilitates the various science focused capacity building programmes), the assistance and protection branch, the Verification Division or the Inspectorate (but don’t expect to be going on any inspection missions as an intern!).

OPCWDay (which actually lasts for three days) is a conference being held to celebrate the foundation of the OPCW in 1997.  This is the first time we have held such an event and it is meant to not just reflect back upon a 19 year journey from 1997 to 2016, but to look forward to the future and what it may bring.  You can see what it is all about at

For 2016 (the inaugural event and 19th anniversary), the conference theme was “Chemical Safety and Security in a Technology Evolving World” and we had panel discussions and speakers who could speak to how the world around us has changed and continues to change – changes that certainly impact how an international treaty is viewed and implemented.  For those interested in the programme, the names of the speakers and topics of the sessions are available here

​So far the meeting has brought many interesting discussions and perspectives on our work.

A larger event to celebrate the 20th anniversary is planned for 2017, more details to follow over the next few months.

Dear Joe and Jonathan,

I’d like to ask a few more questions, one philosophical, and two technical.

Why is OPCW running a Confchem?  In figure two you indicate the 4 areas of focus for the OPCW, and your papers states that 90+ percent of declared chemical weapons have been destroyed, with the rest slated to be destroyed in the next couple of years. If I read your paper right, once this initial phase is accomplished your mission sort of changes focus to preventing the reemergence of chemical weapons and “promotion of the peaceful use of chemistry”.  I am assuming there is a role for chemical educators in this phase and that through this paper, and the ensuing papers we can find ways to be involved. Is this why you are running a Confchem, and if so, let’s be sure to get some discussion up over the next 6 weeks that enables this. So let me rephrase this question, what are you hoping to gain by running a ConfChem?

Now I do have some technical questions, and you may want to respond to these with separate comments.  Let’s start with the basics, what are schedule 1 and schedule 2 chemicals? I understand that these can be created unintentionally.  Can cleaning PVC pipes with sulfur containing cleaning agents result in a chemical weapon?  Is there a list of exemplars that educators could use in their lesson plans? 

And for another basic question, how are chemical weapons destroyed?  I have always thought they were just burned, but are there irreversible chemical processes that convert them to stable (potentially useful) compounds?  Is there a Green Chemistry Approach to destroying chemical weapons?

I’m going to let Joe take on the question of why OPCW is involved with this ConfChem as he has a lead role in the conceptual work in education and outreach.

I’m happy to take on the technical questions though!  Starting with Scheduled Chemicals

The Chemical Weapons Convention contains three Schedules of chemicals, the specific chemicals and classes of chemicals on these Schedules have a link to chemical weapons programmes of the past.

Schedule 1 chemicals are chemicals that have been used as chemical warfare agents and generally have no other uses (and there are always exceptions such as the use of nitrogen mustard in chemotherapy).  Schedule 2 chemicals are typically pre-cursor compounds that can be converted into Schedule 1 Chemicals (and there are also degradation products of some Schedule 1 chemicals).   Schedule 2 also contains some other chemicals which could potentially be used as a chemical agent (BZ for example)

An infographic that explains in more detail what defines each of the Schedules is available at

An important thing to note is that the presence of a chemical on a schedule, does not make that chemical a chemcial warfare agent (although some certainly are).  And, a chemical not on a schedule can be a  “chemical weapon” if used in a way that meets the criteria of a chemical weapon – this criteria comes from Article II of the Chemical Weapons Convention (

“Toxic Chemical” means:

“Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.”

As far as unintentionally producing a Schedule 1 Chemical, yes that can happen under certain circumstances.  I think you have been reading our “Science for Diplomats” section as we had a briefing on this very topic (with the PVC example) last year.  You can see the presentation here:

Incineration is certainly one method that can be used, however the preffered method is hydrolysis which is used in both the United States and Russia (the countries with the largest stoickpiles of chemical weapons that had to be destroyed under the treaty).

You can find descriptions and videos of the destruction methods used at the US chemcial weapon destruction facilities in Colorado and Kentucky at this link

For a comphreheive review of destruction methods, see this paper (and there are some microbial and enzymatic approaches described)

For those who don't have access to Chemical Reviews, an open access article that describes the incineration and hydrolysis chemistry of destruction can be found in the August 2014 issue of OPCW Today (see page 10)


Thanks Bob - so, what do we want to gain by running a confchem?  Well, in short, we see fora like this as being a really important way to connect with some of our target audiences.  Sometimes we speak around here about "chemistry practitioners" - this is intentionally a very broad phrase, and it can take in all those people involved in chemistry, from researchers, to funders, to educators, to professionals in the chemical industry, to those otherwise handling or transporting chemicals.  And we also talk about young people as being one of our target audiences.  So this confchem is a really useful and interesting way to engage chemical educators, and, through them, the young people they teach.  

Now, taking a further step back, why do we want to connect with these people?  As you very rightly say in your question, it's because our success in the future in achieving and maintaining a world free of chemical weapons (and responding to growing threats such as those posed by terrorist use of toxic chemicals) cannot be achieved by us at the OPCW alone.  It will require a much broader group of stakeholders - for want of a better term - to see that protecting and advancing the global ban on chemical weapons is a useful thing to do, and it is in all of our interests.  

So yes, there is a pretty important role that chemical educators can play in all of this - not just by teaching about the Chemical Weapons Convention, but also the concepts and values that stand behind it - and we are very interested in hearing their views about how they can contribute.  Our new Advisory Board on Education and Outreach will also be keen to get a sense from those "on the ground" about how we can help them to do this.



I enjoyed reading your paper I have 2 questions.

1) From the description on the OPCW internship link it is understandable why many applicants are non STEM majors. Are there any other technical qualifications one would need to have in order to be qualified for an OPCW internship? I attend a 4 year university that hosts career fairs 2 times a year, if you send a representative to a STEM career fair you may be able to obtain more undergraduate STEM majors within your internship program.

2) Is there a plan to monitor various chemical manufacturers in order to make sure there is no production of harmful chemical products? 

Hi Zach,

The reality of our internships is that most opportunities do not require a STEM background (and many of the hiring managers are not STEM trained).  The most notable exceptions being the Verification Division, which includes the OPCW Laboratory, and interns working with the Science Policy Adviser.  As you noted, the website reflects this.  With that said, we have seen some very bright STEM trained interns come through our offices.  How did they learn about OPCW?  Some learned of OPCW through following world events, others applied after seeing an OPCW presentation at a conference, while others may have been referred to OPCW through a professor who may have worked with the Scientific Advisory Board or participated in one of the capacity building programmes.

OPCW does participate in career fairs from time to time and this certainly helps to inform people about the types of opportunities available.  However, one thing we didn’t mention in the paper, is that as an international organisation we recruit our staff (and interns) from across our 192 States Parties (the current staffing of ~450 people is made up of nationals from over 80 countries).  Given the international nature of our organisation, our outreach activities are in effect the best way to inform people about what we do and what opportunities we have (especially internships).


In regard to monitoring chemical manufacturers, one of the obligations of a State under the Chemical Weapons Convention is that they enact laws to ensure compliance with the Convention within their territories (“National Implementation”).  These national laws would include industry reporting and monitoring, trade controls and criminal legislation.  National implementation is also a way that the States can show one another that they are complying with the treaty (and building trust amongst the States who have obligations to a treaty is an important aspect of the multi-lateral diplomacy required to maintain an effective treaty regime).

As mentioned in the paper, there already are industry inspections that take place across the States that have industrial chemical facilities (about 80 of the current 192 States have facilities subject to inspection).  Can you imagine international chemical weapons inspectors inspecting chemical production facilities in the United States?  And with the consent of the United States government?  This actually happens every year (as it does in the approximately 80 other States Parties with suitable industrial facilities).  The annual reports referred to the in the paper have some statistics on industry inspections.  In 2015 there were 241 industry inspections, this may seem low given they are occurring across the planet, but the inspected facilities (and others across the State) are also subject to national regulatory regimes and inspections (and there may also be other regional and international regulatory regimes dealing with chemicals that result in further monitoring of a given facility).